Barbara Dibattista v. Buckalew Frizell & Crevina by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-21-2014 
Barbara Dibattista v. Buckalew Frizell & Crevina 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Barbara Dibattista v. Buckalew Frizell & Crevina" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 748. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/748 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________ 
 
No. 13-4486 
_________ 
 
  BARBARA DIBATTISTA,  
    
Appellant  
 
v. 
 
BUCKALEW, FRIZELL & CREVINA, LLP; 
JOHN DOES 1-25 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01639) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
_______ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2014 
 
Before:   SMITH, VANASKIE and SLOVITER Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 21, 2014)  
 
_______________             
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.  
 
This case involves a purported violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., by Defendant-Appellee Buckalew, Frizzel & 
Crevina, LLP, (“Buckalew”), a law firm acting on behalf of the owners of the alleged 
debt in question, The Kensington Gate Homeowners Association, Inc. (“Kensington” or 
“the Association”).  Plaintiff-Appellant Barbara DiBattista (“DiBattista”) filed a putative 
class action complaint against Buckalew for violating various sections of the FDCPA 
after Buckalew sent a letter to DiBattista attempting to collect a debt purportedly owed by 
DiBattista to Kensington, as well as a fee for preparing the letter.  The District Court 
granted Buckalew’s motion to dismiss the case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure 
to state a claim.  For the reasons set out below, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling.1   
I. 
 DiBattista owns real property in Marlboro, New Jersey, located in the Kensington 
Gate community.  Property owners in the community must be members of the 
homeowners’ association and pay an assessment to the Association as set out in the 
governing document of the Association (“the Agreement”).  The Buckalew law firm 
represented Kensington (and other similar entities) on various matters, including 
enforcing claims against property owners for failure to comply with their obligations 
under the Agreement.   
                                              
1
 As this dispute arose under federal law—the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., the 
District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction over an 
appeal from a final decision of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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 Purportedly, DiBattista repeatedly failed to make her scheduled assessment 
payments.
2
  (App. II 17)  On March 12, 2013, Buckalew sent a letter (“the Letter”) to 
DiBattista, informing her that Buckalew represented Kensington, stating that DiBattista 
was behind on her payments, and explaining various remedial steps that could or would 
be taken if DiBattista did not take appropriate steps to remedy the situation.  Those steps 
included Kensington filing a lien against the property, a foreclosure action, or a collection 
lawsuit.  The Letter also explained what DiBattista could do to contest the debt, and set 
forth expressly the amount owed.  (App. II 17-18) 
 Four days after receiving the Letter, DiBattista sent a reply, via counsel, contesting 
the validity of the debt, and filed a lawsuit against Buckalew alleging violations of the 
FDCPA and seeking statutory and other damages.  Specifically, DiBattista alleged that 
Buckalew violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e (prohibiting false, deceptive, or misleading 
representations); 1692e(5) (prohibiting threats to take any action that cannot be legally 
taken or that is not intended to be taken); 1692e(10) (prohibiting the use of any false 
representation or deceptive means to collect a debt); 1692g(a)(1) (requiring notice as to 
the amount of the debt owed); 1692g(a)(3) (requiring notice of time limits on disputing a 
debt); and 1692f (prohibiting using unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt).  
Buckalew filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim.  The District Court considered each allegation in turn and determined that, 
                                              
2
 The actual validity of the debt, and the amount owed, if any, are not before us at this 
time.  We therefore do not address these issue. 
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“[DiBattista] has failed to state any plausible claim under the FDCPA”, and granted 
Buckalew’s motion to dismiss.  (App. 10)  DiBattista appealed.   
II. 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s order granting a motion to 
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and accept as true the well-pled factual allegations 
in the complaint, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Santomenno v. 
John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 677 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2012).  We apply the same 
standard that the District Court should have applied, determining whether the complaint 
“contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  This requires 
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 
of action will not do.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).  We need not “accept 
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”  Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 
265, 286 (1986) (citation omitted).  The “mere possibility of misconduct” does not 
suffice to grant relief.   Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 
III. 
 “Because the FDCPA is a remedial statute, . . . we construe its language broadly, 
so as to effect its purpose.”  Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citations omitted).  In doing so, we evaluate communications between lenders and 
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debtors from “the perspective of the ‘least sophisticated debtor’,” so as to protect “the 
gullible as well as the shrewd.”  Id. at 454 (citations omitted).  However, even though the 
“least sophisticated debtor” standard is a low one, it still should serve to “prevent[] 
liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices by preserving a 
quotient of reasonableness and presuming a basic level of understanding and willingness 
to read with care.”  Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354-55 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(citation omitted).  Furthermore, “Even the least sophisticated debtor is bound to read 
collection notices in their entirety.”  Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt. Inc., 
550 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 
 DiBattista breaks her claim into several “points”, and we shall address those in 
turn. 
A. “Written Notice of the Amount of the Debt” 
 The FDCA requires that a debt collector provide the consumer with written notice 
concerning, “(1) the amount of the debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1).  DiBattista contends 
that the Letter from Buckalew failed to meet this standard.  The Letter stated, in its first 
paragraph, that DiBattista was “in arrears on payment of [her] monthly common expenses 
and/or other charges due to the Association in the amount of $3,216.84 as of March 12, 
2013.”  (App. II 17)  On the second page, the Letter stated, “Please be advised that if you 
do not make payment in full to the Association of the above-stated amount (plus $75.00 
for the attorneys’ fees incurred in preparing this letter) by April 15, 2013, the 
Association may file a lien claim against your unit”.  (App. II 18 emphasis added).  
6 
 
DiBattista contends that this would leave the least sophisticated consumer unsure as to 
how much she owed, and is therefore a violation of § 1692g(a)(1).   
 DiBattista suggests that it is a clear violation of § 1692g(a)(1) not to state the 
amount owed in a single sum, but rather to require calculations. This claim is not 
supported by citation to any case law, nor does DiBattista provide any evidence that she 
was in fact significantly confused by the necessity to add two sums together in order to 
determine the exact amount owed.   Most of DiBattista’s brief in this court is directed to 
the inclusion in the Letter of the $75.00 lawyer’s fee for preparing the notice letter.   
The District Court ably disposed of DiBattista’s argument in this respect:  
With respect to § 1692g(a)(1), Plaintiff asserts that Defendant  
violated this section by “[f]ailing to properly disclose the  
amount due” [Comp. ¶ 43].  Plaintiff further states that Defendant’s  
collection letter . . .  caused Plaintiff uncertainty and forced  
her to guess how much money she allegedly owed and how much  
money she would need to pay by April 15, 2013 to prevent 
[the Association] from filing a lien claim against her unit” (Id. ¶ 32). 
This Court finds no support in the Complaint for this allegation. 
The Letter, as submitted by Plaintiff, states that Plaintiff owes  
“$3,216.84 . . . plus $75.00 for the attorneys’ fees incurred in  
preparing this letter”  (Id. Ex. A).  This language clearly informs  
even the “least sophisticated debtor” of the amount that is owed.  
 
DiBattista v. Buckalew, No. 2:13-cv-01639 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2013) at 10.  The Court’s 
opinion continued: 
  
Finally, with respect to § 1692e, [DiBattista] states . . . that  
Defendant violated this section by “[u]sing false, 
deceptive and misleading representations or means in 
connection with the collection of any debt” (Id. ¶ 43)  Plaintiff  
asserts that the Letter is false, deceptive, and misleading 
because Defendant did not effectively state the amount  
of the alleged debt and falsely stated that the Association  
will assume the debt to be valid unless it is disputed (Id. ¶ 31) . . . 
   [t]his Court rejects these arguments.  Accordingly, Plaintiff  
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   has failed to state any plausible claim under the FDCPA  
and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
 
DiBattista presents no reason not to affirm the District Court’s conclusion 
that the Letter “clearly informs even the ‘least sophisticated debtor’ of the amount that is 
owed.”  (App. 10) We agree it is not unreasonable to expect even the least sophisticated 
debtor to be able to perform the simple addition of two sums in a case such as this, and 
DiBattista’s argument consists of nothing more than repeating the language of                 
§ 1692g(a)(1) while asserting, without support, that the Letter violates the section. 
B. “Misleading and Deceptive” 
 DiBattista contends that the Letter sent to her by Buckalew was “misleading and 
deceptive to the least sophisticated consumer like [DiBattista] because it could be read to 
have two or more different meanings, one of which was inaccurate.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 
14).  15 U.S.C. § 1692e states that, “A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or 
misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt”, while 
the various sub-sections of § 1692e provide a non-exhaustive list of actions that would 
violate the requirements of this section of the FDCPA.  DiBattista contends, in particular, 
that the Letter violates § 1692e(5), which prohibits a “threat to take any action that cannot 
legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken”, and § 1692e(10), which prohibits  the 
“use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any 
debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.”   
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 According to DiBattista, two sections of the Letter in particular were problematic.  
After first notifying DiBattista that she owed $3,216.84 in over-due assessments and 
other charges, the Letter, on the subsequent page, stated: 
Please be advised that if you do not make payment in full to the Association of 
the above-stated amount (plus $75.00 for the attorneys’ fees incurred in 
preparing this letter) by April 15, 2013, the Association may file a lien claim 
against your unit and/or institute a foreclosure action or collection lawsuit 
seeking payment of all amounts due—including acceleration of your annual 
common expense assessment through the end of the Association’s current fiscal 
year, which is December 31, 2013—plus interest, late charges, costs of suit and 
attorneys’ fees. . . .    
 
Please be advised that unless you, within thirty (30) days after receipt of this 
notice, dispute the validity of the debt or any portion thereof, the debt will be 
assumed to be valid by this law firm and the Association; moreover if you notify 
this law firm in writing within the 30-day period that the debt or any portion 
thereof is disputed, the firm will obtain a verification of the debt and mail it to 
you.   
 (App. II 18, emphases added). 
 
 DiBattista claims that these sections are “misleading and deceptive” insofar as 
they might lead a least sophisticated debtor to be unsure what amount of money was due 
to the Association, whether a lien could be filed if she paid only some lesser amount, and 
whom she must contact to exercise her rights, as set out in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4), to 
contest a debt and receive verification of the amount owed.  As we have already 
addressed the question of the amount owed, we shall focus on the other two issues.  
 DiBattista claims that the above language is “misleading and deceptive” and 
therefore violates § 1692e(5) because “Upon information and belief, Defendant has never 
filed a lien claim on behalf of Kensington for $75.00 when such amount represented the 
only amount due, and was the result of attorneys’ fees incurred in preparing a letter.”  
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(Appellant’s Br. at 16)  There are two flaws with this argument.  First, DiBattista has 
made insufficient assertions to support this claim.  The claim therefore fails to meet the 
standard set out in Twombly.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring plaintiffs to assert 
factual allegations sufficient to raise a right of relief above a speculative level and 
advance a showing of entitlement to a right of relief). 
 Additionally, the Agreement between DiBattista and Kensington specifically 
allows for the collection of attorneys’ fees and the filing of a lien, in the case of past-due 
assessments, as are alleged here.  (App. II 65, 68)  Somewhat confusingly, DiBattista 
here claims that the $75.00 fee for preparing the Letter is a “contingency fee.”   A recent 
decision from the District Court of New Jersey, decided after the District Court in this 
case issued its opinion, did consider whether a contingency fee for collection can be 
included in the amount reported to a consumer.  See Ardino v. Solomon and Solomon, 
P.C., 2014 WL 268680 (D.N.J., Jan. 23, 2014).  Although Ardino held that a demand for 
an as-yet indeterminate amount for legal costs that had not yet accrued stated a 
cognizable claim under the FDCPA, Ardino is distinguishable.  This case deals with a 
determinate amount, authorized by the Agreement, which, as stated in the Letter, had 
already been incurred.  DiBattista’s repeated unsupported claim that the $75.00 fee is a 
“contingency fee” cannot change this fact.  The Letter, therefore, does not violate §§ 
1692e(5) or (10) in this regard.
3
   
                                              
3
 DiBattista also argues that the collection notice was misleading because it suggested 
that the Association could file a lien against her unit even if the only amount owed was 
the $75.00 in attorneys’ fees, when in fact such a lien is prohibited by New Jersey Law.  
This argument is based on a misreading of N.J.S.A. 46:8B-21.a, which prohibits an 
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 Finally, DiBattista claims that the second quoted paragraph from the Letter above 
is “misleading or deceptive” because it would make her unsure whom she should contact 
to assert her rights under § 1692g(a)(4).  DiBattista claims that the Letter left her unsure 
whether she should contact Buckalew, the Association, or both.  The District Court 
correctly rejected this argument.  As the District Court noted, the language of this section 
of the Letter very closely tracks that of § 1692g(a)(4).  (App. 6-7)  The only significant 
difference is the inclusion, in the Letter, of the clause “and the association” after 
“assumed to be valid by this firm”.  (App. 7)  The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, when faced with an essentially similar claim, has held that similar language did 
not violate § 1692g(a)(4).  See Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360, 
365-66 (2d Cir. 2005).  DiBattista cites no contrary authority in this (or any other) circuit, 
and it is unclear how the inclusion of the cited language could lead even an 
unsophisticated debtor not to protect her rights.  The language in the Letter clearly states 
that it is “this law firm” which should be contacted.  Even if the additional language did 
lead to mild confusion, at worst this would lead to the harmless error of Kensington being 
contacted as well as Buckalew.  Although DiBattista argues that the Second Circuit’s 
decision is not precedential on this issue, we agree with it.  We will affirm the District 
Court’s order on this claim.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
association from filing a lien when “the unpaid assessment consists only of late fees.”    
Because N.J.S.A. 46:8B-21a does not prohibit an association from filing a lien when the 
unpaid assessment consists only of attorneys’ fees, we reject this argument as well. 
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C. “Unfair or Unconscionable Means” 
 Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1), it is a presumptively prohibited unfair or 
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect “any amount (including any 
interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount 
is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.”  
DiBattista claims that, by including a $75.00 fee for preparing the Letter, Buckalew 
violated this clause of the FDCPA.  However, as the District Court noted, language in the 
Agreement explicitly allows Kensington to include attorneys’ fees in the amount sought 
in collection.  (App. 6)  DiBattista attempts to make an issue out of the fact that in one of 
the two places in the Agreement where attorneys’ fees are discussed, the Agreement 
allows for a charge of 20% of the amount sought, an amount that is significantly different 
from, and certainly higher than, the $75.00 actually sought.  (App. II 68)  Why this 
should matter is not, however, clear, especially as the Agreement also allows for 
“reasonable attorney’s fees.”  (App. II 65)  What is clear is that DiBattista has not alleged 
any facts that would, if accepted as true, constitute a violation of § 1692f(1). 
D. Alternative of Dismissal Without Prejudice 
 DiBattista suggests, at several points, that the fundamental flaw the District Court 
found in the complaint was that it failed to specifically claim that the $75.00 fee charged 
by Buckalew for preparing the Letter was a “contingency fee.”  DiBattista argues that 
rather than dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim, the complaint should be 
dismissed without prejudice so that she could amend the complaint to include the term 
“contingency fee.”  This argument is without merit.  Although the District Court did 
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comment on the lack of the phrase “contingency fee” in the relevant section of the 
complaint, the most relevant finding of the District Court was that, “[DiBattista] has 
alleged no facts in the Complaint that support the notion that the attorney’s fees were not 
yet due at the time that [Buckalew] sent the letter.”  (App. at 8)  This conclusion stands, 
for reasons noted above, on appeal.  The problem with the complaint is not the lack of 
some “magic words”, but the lack of any assertions to support the claim.   
IV. Conclusion 
 For the reasons set out above, the District Court did not err in holding that 
DiBattista had failed to state a claim, and did not err in dismissing the complaint under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  We will affirm.   
 
